救救全球化的输家

作者：美国前财政部长拉里•萨默斯(Larry Summers)
2006年10月31日 星期二


尽管困难重重，但我们仍生活在一个繁荣的时代。无论是2001年9•11事件的余波，还是上涨了两倍的油价，都未能阻碍世界经济过去5年的迅猛发展，其增长速度超过了有记载的经济史上任何一个5年时期。

鉴于近年的这种经济表现和全球市场对乐观前景的认可，人们可能会认为，对于市场体系和全球一体化而言，这是一个充满激情的时刻。

然而，在全球的许多角落，理想破灭的情况日益增多。从多哈(Doha)回合贸易谈判的失败，到沃尔玛(Wal-Mart)的广受谴责，从俄罗斯的大规模国 有化，到拉美和东欧民粹主义政界人物的成功，我们都可以看到，对市场体系的担忧达到了自柏林墙倒塌以来（甚至可能在此之前很久）从未有过的程度。

为什么会有这种理想破灭的情况呢？某些反全球化情绪，可被视为抵制美国的表现，而这源自布什(Bush)政府外交政策的灾难。但还有一个更令人不安的缘由：人们越来越认识到，全球大量的中产阶级，没有分享到当前经济增长期的益处——它们分得的“馅饼”甚至可能在不断缩小。

有两个人群在合适的时间处在了合适的地点，可以从全球化和技术变革中获益。首先是那些能融入全球体系、生活在低收入国家的人，主要是亚洲国家，特别是中国。低工资、可传播的技术、进入全球产品及金融市场的能力，这些因素结合，引发了这些国家经济的爆炸型增长。

有一点需要记住：英国和欧洲大陆18世纪末至19世纪初的这段时期被称为工业革命(Industrial Revolution)是有原因的。在人类历史上首次出现了一代人的生活水平明显好于上一代的情况：在一个人的一生中，实际人均收入翻了一番，然后又翻了 一番。看看过去30年中国的经济增长率就会知道，中国人的生活水平达到这样一种提高速度：在一个人的一生中可以改善一百倍。这种影响怎么强调都不过分。

其次，对于已经拥有宝贵资产的人来说，这是个黄金时代。稀缺大宗商品的拥有者，看到了自己的回报大幅上升。能够利用全球化获得廉价劳动力并将产品出售给大 市场的企业经营者，其收入的增长比一般人快得多。当然，那些身处金融领域、能够从全球化带来的资产重估中获益的人，都发了大财。

其他人的境遇不可同日而语。在庞大、高效率的企业引擎利用前沿科技和廉价劳动力获得成功之际，普通的中产阶级劳动者及其雇主——无论他们生活在美国中西 部、鲁尔谷 (Ruhr valley)、拉美或是东欧——被排挤在外。为什么美国家庭收入中值远远落后于生产率增长？为什么墨西哥平均家庭收入自《北美自由贸易协定》 (North American Free Trade Agreement)通过以来的13年里几乎没有增长？为什么缺乏自然资源的中等收入国家难以找到比较优势领域？这就是其中的根本原因。

正是这个庞大的群体缺乏从全球化中受益的资本，迫切希望寻求安慰或变革。然而，如果没有该群体的支持，现有的全球经济秩序能否得以维持是一个巨大的疑问。

坦言之，外界向焦虑的全球中产阶级所描述的，往往感觉“单薄”。全球化不可避免、保护主义适得其反的双重主张，固然正确，但不能给全球化进程的输家带来多少安慰。这些主张也无法凝聚共识，为保持全球化进程提供政策支持，更不用说推进这一进程了。

经济学家们强调，像其它形式的进步一样，贸易能让大家以更低廉的价格购买商品，从而使每个人都更为富裕。这种说法固然正确，但难以给那些担心失业的人带来安慰。

教育对任何经济战略都很重要，但它对40岁以上工人所起的作用有限。在印度熟练计算机程序员的月薪不足2000美元时，教育也不能完全解决问题。

经济学家高伯瑞(John Kenneth Galbraith)曾经发现：“所有伟大的领袖都有一个共同特点，那就是愿意直面自己所处时代人民的主要忧虑。这一点，而非其它因素，就是领导力的本 质。”这是正确的。满足焦虑的全球中产阶级的需求，正是我们这个时代所面临的经济挑战。

在美国，政治的钟摆正摆向左侧。进步传统的精华部分，与市场体系并不矛盾；它们会改进市场自然产生的结果。这正是我们目前所需要的。

这里没有现成的答案。自由、全球化和科技水平发达的资本主义，从经济逻辑出发，很可能会将更多财富转移至全球最富裕和部分最贫困的人，同时压榨处于中层的人们。

二战后，美国联邦住房管理局(Federal Housing Administration)力争让更多人有自己的住宅，这是“马歇尔计划”(Marshall Plan)得以推行的政策方法中至关重要的一环。同样，我们能否在推进全球一体化方面取得成功，也将取决于我们能为全球大量的中产阶级做些什么。

我们的反应，不仅会影响数以百万计的同胞的生活，还会影响正在继续的全球化的前景，以及全球化有望带来的繁荣和稳定。

本文作者曾任美国财政部长

译者/梁鸥 刘彦




THE GLOBAL MIDDLE CRIES OUT FOR REASSURANCE

By Larry Summers
Tuesday, October 31, 2006


Against all odds, we are living in a time of plenty. Neither the after-effects of September 11 2001 nor a tripling in oil prices has prevented the world’s economy from growing faster in the past five years than in any five-year period in recorded economic history.

Given this recent performance and the pricing-in by world markets of an optimistic outlook, one might have expected this to be a moment of particularly great enthusiasm for the market system and for global integration.

Yet in many corners of the globe there is growing disillusionment. From the failure to complete the Doha trade round to pervasive Wal-Mart-bashing, from massive renationalisation in Russia to the success of populists in Latin America and eastern Europe, we see a degree of anxiety about the market system that is unmatched since the fall of the Berlin Wall and probably well before.

Why is there such disillusionment? Some anti-globalisation sentiment can be seen as a manifestation of resistance to the US arising from the Bush administration’s foreign policy misadventures. But there is a much more troubling source: the growing recognition that the vast global middle is not sharing the benefits of the current period of economic growth – and that its share of the pie may even be shrinking.

Two groups have found themselves in the right place at the right time to benefit from globalisation and technological change. First, those in low-income countries, principally in Asia and especially in China, who are able to plug into the global system. The combination of low wages, diffusible technology and the ability to access global product and financial markets has fuelled an economic explosion.

It is important to remember that the period between the late 18th and early 19th centuries in Britain and continental Europe was called the Industrial Revolution for a reason. For the first time in human history, the standard of living of one generation was demonstrably better than the one before: in a single lifespan, real per capita incomes doubled and then doubled again. If one looks at the growth rate of China during the past 30 years, living standards are increasing at a rate that will lead to a hundred-fold improvement over a single human lifespan. The impact cannot be overstated.

Second, it has been a golden age for those who already own valuable assets. Owners of scarce commodities have seen their returns rise prodigiously. People running businesses that can take advantage of globalisation to source labour less expensively and sell to larger markets have seen their incomes rise far faster than incomes generally. Certainly those in the financial sector in a position to benefit from the asset revaluations associated with globalisation have prospered.

Everyone else has not fared nearly as well. As the great corporate engines of efficiency succeed by using cutting-edge technology with low-cost labour, ordinary, middle-class workers and their employers – whether they live in the American midwest, the Ruhr valley, Latin America or eastern Europe – are left out. This is the essential reason why median family incomes lag far behind productivity growth in the US, why average family incomes in Mexico have barely grown in the 13 years since the North American Free Trade Agreement passed, and why middle-income countries without natural resources struggle to define an area of comparative advantage.

It is this vast group that lacks the capital to benefit from globalisation and is desperately seeking either reassurance or a change in course. Yet without its support it is very doubtful that the existing global economic order can be maintained.

Let us be frank. What the anxious global middle is told often feels like pretty thin gruel. The twin arguments that globalisation is inevitable and protectionism is counterproductive have the great virtue of being correct, but do not provide much consolation for the losers. Nor can they rally support for policies that maintain, let alone promote, international integration.

Economists rightly emphasise that trade, like other forms of progress, makes everyone richer by enabling them to buy goods at lower prices. But this offers small solace to those who fear their jobs will vanish.

Education is central to any economic strategy, but there is a limit to what it can do for workers in their 40s and beyond. Nor can education be a complete answer at a time when skilled computer programmers in India are paid less than $2,000 (£1,050) a month.

John Kenneth Galbraith was right when he observed: “All of the great leaders have had one characteristic in common: it was the willingness to confront unequivocally the major anxiety of their people in their time. This, and not much else, is the essence of leadership.” Meeting the needs of the anxious global middle is the economic challenge of our time.

In the US, the political pendulum is swinging left. The best parts of the progressive tradition do not oppose the market system; they improve on the outcomes it naturally produces. That is what we need today.

There are no easy answers. The economic logic of free, globalised, technologically sophisticated capitalism may well be to shift more wealth to the very richest and some of the very poorest in the world, while squeezing people in the middle.

Just as the Federal Housing Administration’s effort to make owner-occupied housing more available after the second world war was a crucial part of the policy approach that permitted the Marshall Plan to go forward, so also our success in advancing international integration will depend on what can be done for the great global middle.

Our response will affect not just the livelihoods of millions of our fellow citizens but also the prospects for continuing global integration, with all the prosperity and stability it has the potential to bring.

The writer is former US Treasury secretary